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Case No. 20080378-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
KENDRA MABEY AND TIMOTHY MABEY, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendants appeal from their conviction for production of marijuana, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(i) (West 
Supp. 2006). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)(e) (West Supp. 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Was the search of Defendants7 home and seizure of contraband therein 
justified under the consent exception to the warrant requirement? 
Standard of Review. A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to 
suppress is a mixed question of law and fact. The court's legal conclusions are 
reviewed non-def erentially for correctness, including its application of the legal 
standard to the facts. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, f 11,103 P.3d 699. The court's 
underlying factual findings are reviewed for clear error. State v. Krukowski, 2004 
UT 94, f 11,100 P.3d 1222. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, A N D RULES 
U.S. Const, amend. IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Following a warrantless search of their home on April 15, 2007, 
defendants Kendra Mabey and Timothy Mabey were charged by information 
with possession of marijuana in a drug free zone; possession of drug 
paraphernalia in a drug free zone; production of marijuana in a drug free zone; 
and child endangerment. KM. 6-5; TM. 7-6.] Defendant Kendra Mabey was 
bound over to stand trial on all counts; defendant Timothy Mabey was bound 
over to stand trial on all counts but child endangerment. KM. 29-28; TM. 27-26. 
Defendants moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the warrantless search 
was not justified by an exception to the warrant requirement. KM. 40-37; TM. 
43-37. The trial court denied the motion. KM. 71-64 (Addendum A); TM. 64-57. 
1
 The record in the case of Kendra Mabey is cited as "KM" and the record 
in the case of Timothy Mabey is cited as 'TM/7 Kendra's mother, Tammy 
Willbanks, was also charged, but she is not a party to the appeal. See KM. 6. 
.? -
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendants thereafter entered conditional 
guilty pleas to production of marijuana, a third degree felony, reserving their 
right to appeal the trial court's order denying their motion to suppress. KM. 85-
77, 88-87; TM. 81-71. The district court sentenced both defendants to an 
indeterminate prison term of zero to five years, but suspended their sentence 
and placed them on supervised probation for 36 months. KM. 92-90; TM. 86-83. 
Defendants timely appealed. KM. 96-95; TM. 90-89. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS2 
On the afternoon of April 15,2007, Officer jay Hurst and a second officer 
were dispatched to the residence of Timothy and Kendra Mabey on a report that 
a woman was having a seizure. Tr. 4-5, 15, 21 (KM. 70: \ l).3 Upon Officer 
Hurst's arrival, the ambulance crew was already in the process of loading 
Kendra Mabey's mother, Tammy Willbanks, into the ambulance. Tr. 5-6,10,15, 
22 (KM. 70: f 2). Willbanks had been tending the children of the Mabeys, who 
were not at home. Tr. 15-16 (KM. 70: \ 4). One child was now at a neighbor's 
home and the other children were on the front lawn. Tr. 15. 
2
 The facts are taken from the preliminary hearing transcript, upon which 
the district court relied in ruling on the motion to suppress. See KM. 71. The 
transcript of the preliminary hearing appears in both records (KM. 105 & TM 
110), and will simply be cited as "Tr./7 followed by the page number. 
3
 The residence was within 1000 feet of a church. Tr. 14. 
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Officer Hurst saw marijuana stuck to Willbanks' stretcher and an EMT 
told Hurst that the ambulance crew discovered marijuana in the home while 
they searched for Willbanks' insulin. Tr. 5-6 (KM. 70: ^ 3, 5). Upon Officer 
Hurst's request, the EMT led the two officers to the master bedroom, where the 
marijuana was found. Tr. 6,13, 21 (KM. 70: f 6). In plain view, Officer Hurst 
saw three marijuana plants on the counter of the master bathroom, and a 
marijuana pipe and marijuana joints in the master bedroom. Tr. 6,8-9,25 (KM. 
70: m 7-8). The officers swept the house "to make sure there [were] no other 
O^^U.jpa.LLU3 JLLL LLLC i C o i U C i L L C , XAVJZAT Li LC C i L V i i v i LLi i e i LL, CULU. vTAiLeU. Li lC i C M U C i l L C . 
See Tr. 7,15-16, 28 (KM. 70: ^ 9). Officer Hurst called Sergeant Lance Smith, 
apprised him of what had been found in the home, and requested his assistance. 
Tr. 7, 24, 27 (KM. 70: 110).4 
Upon Sergeant Smith's arrival, Officers Hurst and Shaw accompanied 
him into the Mabey home and showed him the drugs and paraphernalia that 
were in plain view. Tr. 7,16, 24-25, 27 (KM. 70: f 11). Thereafter, the officers 
exited the home and awxaited the arrival of Kendra and Timothy Mabey, who 
were expected shortly. Tr. 24 (KM. 70: ^ 12). When the Mabeys arrived, the 
officers explained why they had responded to their home, told them that 
4
 Officer Hurst also went to a neighbor's home, where the children had 
gone, to gather information on them. Tr. 7. 
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Kendra's mother had been taken to the hospital, and reassured Kendra that her 
mother was "all right." Tr. 7-9, 24 (KM. 70-69: ^ 13). Thereafter, the officers 
separated Kendra and Timothy Mabey, explained to each that the ambulance 
crew had shown them the marijuana plants and paraphernalia inside the home, 
and advised each of his or her Miranda rights. Tr. 9-10, 24-25 (KM. 69: *[f 13). 
Kendra and Timothy each admitted to taking care of the marijuana plants, to 
possessing additional marijuana in their truck, and to smoking marijuana 
together that morning. Tr. 10-11,14, 26-27. 
iw?CLclCC!±LL c / i i L L L i l u U V 1 D C U LJLLC iV±CLL/v~y& Li I d L VJJL±i\_\_i o i i v^v^dv^L i L\J OCLZJVJ Li LtT 
contraband and "would like to do it either by consent form, or [pursuant to] a 
search warrant." Tr. 25. He explained that "either way, on their choice, the 
items were going to be taken out, and they were going to be arrested." Tr. 25. 
He explained that "[t]he only difference between a consent form and a search 
warrant was time; one would be done a lot quicker, and the other one would 
take some time to write the search warrant and have a [j]udge sign it." Tr. 25. 
After consulting together, the Mabeys agreed to allow the search and signed a 
consent form. Tr. 17,25 (KM. 69: ^ f 13). Officers seized the marijuana plants and 
other paraphernalia, as well as a photograph of Timothy Mabey smoking 
marijuana and a photograph of Kendra Mabey smoking marijuana. Tr. 17-18, 
29-30 (KM. 69: ^ 14). 
o-
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A consent search is valid under the Fourth Amendment if (1) the consent 
was voluntary, and (2) the consent was not the product of prior police illegality. 
Defendants did not challenge the voluntariness of the consent in the 
district court below and have not argued plain error or exceptional 
circumstances on appeal. Accordingly, this Court should not address their 
voluntariness challenge now. In any event, no facts in the record suggest that 
Defendants7 consent was coerced. 
The consent to search was also not the product of a prior police illegality. 
X A J . V_>» J 
Defendants7 reasonable expectation of privacy in their home was extinguished 
when the EMTs had to enter the home and search the bedroom for insulin. 
Where the officers7 inspection of the bedroom went no further than the EMTs, 
there was no search under the Fourth Amendment. In any event, the officer's 
entry was justified under the exigent circumstances exception, to ensure that no 
other children were in the home and to secure the home. Finally, even assuming 
arguendo police illegality, the consent was not the product of that illegality. The 
purpose of the entry was not to secure consent. The intrusion was nominal-
Defendants7 expectation of privacy had already been frustrated by the EMTs 
entry. Moreover, Defendants were advised of their Miranda rights. And finally, 
Defendants did not arrive at the home until some time after the officers7 entry. 
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ARGUMENT 
The district court ruled that the initial search of Defendants' home by 
Officer Hurst "was supported by probable cause and exigent circumstances/7 
KM. 65. The court ruled that the second search by Officer Hurst and Sergeant 
Smith "was not supported by exigent circumstances or any other exception to 
the warrant requirement/' KM. 65. The court ruled that the third search of the 
home "was supported by consent." KM. 65. The court thus denied Defendants' 
motion to suppress the "evidence discovered as a direct result of [the first and 
third] searches." KM. 65. However, it granted. ueiencLarLt's motion to suppress 
"to the extent [the] Motion relates to evidence discovered as a direct result of 
[the second] search." KM. 65. This Court should affirm. 
* * * 
"[0]ne of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of 
both a warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to 
consent." Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,219 (1973). A consent to search 
is valid under the Fourth Amendment "only if '(1) [t]he consent was given 
voluntarily, and (2) the consent was not obtained by police exploitation of [a] 
prior illegality.'" State v. Hansen, 2002 UT125, ^ 47,63 P.3d 650 (quoting State v. 
Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1262 (Utah 1993)). The consent search in this case 
satisfied both requirements. 
-7-
I. 
DEFENDANTS' CONSENT TO SEARCH THEIR HOME WAS 
VOLUNTARILY GIVEN 
Defendants make a cursory argument that their consent to the search was 
involuntary. See Aplt. Brf. at 14. Noting Sergeant Smith's testimony that "he 
told [them] that the only difference between consent and a warrant was t ime/ ' 
Defendants argue that they "were faced with a situation in which they believed 
their only option was to allow their home to be searched." Aplt. Brf. at 14. 
However, they made no such argument below. See KM. 40-38,60-55; TM. 53-48. 
They argued only that the consent to search was "tainted by the prior [two] 
search[es]." KM. 49-48; TM. 56-55. Because Defendants did not preserve their 
voluntariness argument below and have not argued plain error or exceptional 
circumstances, this Court should not address it for the first time on appeal. See 
State v. Johnson, 2007 UT App 184, f 23,163 P.3d 695, cert denied, 186 P.3d 347.5 
In any event, Defendants' consent was not rendered involuntary, simply 
because Sergeant Smith told them he intended to seize the contraband via 
warrant or via consent, in which case the search would occur "a lot quicker." 
See Tr. 25. "Although empty threats to obtain a warrant may at times render a 
5
 This Court should not consider Defendants' argument in any event 
because it is bereft of analysis and citation to relevant authority. See State v. 
Sloan, 2003 UT App 170, \io n.l, 72 P.3d 138 (refusing to consider argument on 
appeal "that does not contain 'reasoned analysis based upon relevant legal 
authority'") (citation omitted). 
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subsequent consent involuntary, the threat in this case was firmly grounded/ ' 
United States v. Duran, 957 F.2d 499, 502 (7th Cir. 1992); accord Commonwealth v. 
Paredes-Rosaria, 700 A.2d 1296,1300 (Pa. Super. 1997). Sergeant SmitlVs personal 
observation of the marijuana on the stretcher, together with the EMT's statement 
that she had seen marijuana in the residence, was more than sufficient evidence 
to support a finding of probable cause. Moreover, Sergeant Smith did not tell 
Defendants he already had a warrant, nor did he suggest that he could lawfully 
search the residence without a warrant or consent. He simply, and truthfully, 
explained to Defendants their options. Such conduct is not coercive. See United 
States v. Garcia, 890 F.2d 355, 361 (11th Cir. 1989). 
II. 
DEFENDANTS' CONSENT TO SEARCH THEIR HOME WAS 
NOT OBTAINED BY POLICE EXPLOITATION OF A PRIOR 
ILLEGALITY. 
Defendants argue that their consent was the product of prior police 
illegality, to wit, the plain view searches by Officer Hurst and Sergeant Smith. 
Aplt. Brf. at 8-15. Those searches, however, were not unlawful and, in any 
event, were not exploited to obtain the consent of Defendants. 
A. The officers7 initial entries into the home were not unlawful. 
The district court concluded that Officer Hurst's initial entry into the 
home was justified under the exigent circumstances exception, ensuring that no 
other children were in the home and exposed to the drugs and paraphernalia. 
-9-
KM. 69-67. The court also concluded that the entry was necessary to secure the 
premises. KM. 67. This Court should affirm. 
1. The officers' entry into the home did not constitute a Fourth 
Amendment search. 
This Court need not reach the merits of the district court's ruling, because 
the officers' entry did not implicate a Fourth Amendment search. See State v. 
Henderson, 2007 UT 1250, ^ 15,159 P.3d 397 (recognizing that "an appellate court 
may affirm a trial court's judgment on an alternative ground . . . if the 
alternative ground is 'apparent on the record' and 'sustainable by the factual 
findings of the trial court'"). 
In United States v. ]acdbsen, the United States Supreme Court explained 
that a Fourth Amendment search takes place only when "governmental action" 
infringes on "an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider 
reasonable." 466 U.S. 109,113 (1984). Ordinarily, such an intrusion occurs when 
police enter a home. See Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966) 
(recognizing that the home unquestionably is "accorded the full range of Fourth 
Amendment protections"). However, a person's expectation of privacy may be 
lost, relinquished, or otherwise compromised, even in his or her own home. See 
Lewis, 385 U.S. at 211. In that case, there is no search for purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment. See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113,120,126. 
-10-
As recognized in Jacobsen, the Fourth Amendment "is wholly inapplicable 
'to a search or seizure . . . effected by a private individual not acting as an agent 
of the Government or with the participation or knowledge of any governmental 
official/ " Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113-14 (citation omitted). Jacobsen also recognized 
that such private searches, whether "accidental or deliberate, and whether . . . 
reasonable or unreasonable/' likewise frustrate the individuars expectation of 
privacy. Id. at 115, 120. Jacobsen thus held that an inspection of property by 
police following a private search "infringe [s] no legitimate expectation of 
L / i i V C i v . V Ci.L L'\A. i. LV_JL L"\~\_ !i.k5j X LKJ L GL ^ v ^ d i . V-X L V'V i l i i Li Lv^  XX L\3. CLX LXX L i^ w i L1L\^ X. V J L l i L i t 
Amendment." Id. at 120. As explained by this Court, once property has been 
examined by a private party, "the defendant's expectation of privacy [is] 
extinguished as to the contents discovered by the private actors." State v. Miller, 
2004 UT App 445, t 9,104 P.3d 1272, cert, denied, 124 P.3d 251 (Utah 2005). 
Jacobsen nevertheless cautioned that "[t]he Fourth Amendment is [still] 
implicated . . . if the authorities use information with respect to which the 
expectation of privacy has not already been frustrated" by the private search. 
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 117-18. In short, a police intrusion following a private 
search may not "r[i]se to the level of a new independent search by police," but 
must be "substantially identical" to the private search. Miller, 2004 UT App 445, 
115; accord United States v. Miller, 152 F.3d 813,815 (8th Or . 1998) (holding that 
-11-
"an ensuing police intrusion [must] stay[ ] within the limits of the private 
search"). Thus, in cases involving a private search, "[t]he additional invasions 
of. . . privacy by the government agent must be tested by the degree to which 
they exceeded the scope of the private search/' Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 115. 
Under Jacobsen, Officer Hurst's entry into the home "infringed no 
legitimate expectation of privacy and hence was not a 'search' within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 120. The EMT's entry into the home 
in search of insulin was done in "a wholly private capacity . . ., and the police 
neither knew about nor acquiesced in their entry." Miller, 152 F.3d at 816. The 
Payson City officers became involved only after the EMT's entry and search. See 
Tr. 5-6,10,15,22. Moreover, Officer Hurst's entry into the bedroom and visual 
inspection therein went no further than the EMT's. See Tr. 6, 8-9,25. "Thus, no 
search occurred at all, so the drug-related evidence found in [the master 
bedroom and bath] was lawfully obtained." Miller, 152 F.3d at 816.6 
The State acknowledges that in United States v. Paige, 136 F.3d 1012 (5th 
Cir. 1998), the Fifth Circuit limited Jacobsen's application in cases involving the 
private search of a home. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that" [u]nlike the package 
6
 Officer Hurst did conduct a cursory sweep of the house "to make sure 
there [were] no other occupants in the residence" and to "fr[ee]ze the 
environment." See Tr. 7,15-16,28 (KM. 70: [^ 9). However, no contraband was 
observed as a result of that sweep. 
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at issue in Jacobsen, which contained nothing but contraband, people's homes 
contain countless personal, non-contraband possessions/7 Paige, 136 F.3d at 1020 
n . l l (internal quotations and citations omitted). The Fifth Circuit held that "a 
homeowner's legitimate and significant privacy expectation in these possessions 
cannot be entirely frustrated simply because, ipso facto, a private pa r ty . . . views 
some of those possessions." Id. The Fifth Circuit held that a prior private party 
search will frustrate one's reasonable expectation of privacy in the home only if 
" the initial entry — pursuant to which the private-party viewing occurred — was 
C* i C u ^ U l l U L / l V l U l \ - . & C V ^ U C i C U L U U O l V i l KJX. U 1 J L V U V . V . 114 . U l JL\J±S l U U U L i i L t l K~A. IL ILL-U 
States v. Bomengo, 580 F.2d 173, 176 (5th Cir. 1978), cert denied, 439 U.S. 1117 
(1979)). 
The Fifth Circuit explained that "[i]n making this determination, 
consideration must be given to whether the activities of the home's occupants or 
the circumstances within the home at the time of the private search created a 
risk of intrusion by the private party that was reasonably foreseeable." Id. at 
1020. The court held that "[i]f indeed the private party's intrusion was 
reasonably foreseeable (based on such activities or circumstances), the occupant 
will no longer possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area or thing 
searched, and the subsequent police search will not trigger the Fourth 
Amendment." Id. (emphasis in original). On the other hand," [i]f... the private 
-13-
party's initial intrusion was not reasonably foreseeable, the occupant's 
reasonable expectation of privacy will survive, and the subsequent police search 
will indeed activate the Fourth Amendment." Id. (emphasis in original). 
The Payson City officers' entry into Defendants' home in this case did not 
implicate a Fourth Amendment search, even under the Fifth Circuit rule. It is 
reasonably foreseeable that occupants in any home may require emergency 
medical assistance due to injury or illness. The foreseeability of such a need is 
even greater where an occupant suffers from a chronic illness, as was the case 
"U ~—~ c~~ T\.. c < n AA7:ni i ,^ —£.£. J ~ JM^\ J_:-. — i \ TJ_.:„ ~ I — _"i_i_T 
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foreseeable that emergency medical personnel may need to look for and secure 
medications in the home needed for a chronically ill patient's care. In short, 
such "entries into [a home] by [medical responders], when made necessary by 
emergency situations, are by no means unforeseeable intrusions when they 
occur." Paige, 136 F.3d at 1020. Consequently, the officers' subsequent 
examination of the master bedroom in this case "did not qualify as a 'search' for 
Fourth Amendment purposes," even under the Fifth Circuit rule. Id. at 1021. 
2. In any event, the district court correctly ruled that Officer 
Hurst's entry was justified under the exigent circumstances 
exception. 
Even assuming, arguendo, Officer Hurst's entry into the home constituted 
a Fourth Amendment search, it was justified under the exigent circumstances 
-14-
exception to the warrant requirement. See KM. 67. As observed by the district 
court, "Officer Hurst . . . knew Ms. Willbanks had been tending the Defendants' 
children," but the "the record [does not] suggest[ ] that [he] knew how many 
children the Defendants' had or whether they had all been removed from the 
home." KM. 67. The court thus correctly concluded that "[t]he delay in 
obtaining a warrant would have risked potential physical harm to the children 
from the exposure to drugs if there were indeed children in the home." KM. 67. 
And as further concluded by the district court, "if the officers had locked down 
LiLC i l V J i i l C VV'iLil L-x LiiULi C i L D L H I X I U I U C / ex iv_ v_x LIIVAI V~X L \~KJ ULXIA. X L C I V ^ O U i i U i C U cxxiA^/ U U l i a i 
trauma." KM. 67. 
Defendants argue that the district court's ruling does not satisfy the test 
for emergency aid entries, as articulated in State v. Comer, 2002 UT 219,5,51 P.3d 
55. Aplt. Brf. at 10-11. Under that test, a warrantless entry is lawful if: 
(1) Police have an objectively reasonable basis to believe that 
an emergency exists and believe there is an immediate need for 
their assistance for the protection of life. 
(2) The search is not primarily motivated by intent to arrest 
and seize evidence. 
(3) There is some reasonable basis to associate the emergency 
with the area or place to be searched. That is, there must be a 
connection with the area to be searched and the emergency. 
Corner, 2002 UT App 219, \ 5,51 P.3d 55 (quoting Salt Lake City v. Davidson, 2000 
UT App 12, % 12,994 P.2d 1283). Defendants contend that the entry in this case 
did not satisfy that test, because (1) "Officer Hurst entered the home for the 
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primary purpose of seizing evidence, a clear violation of the second requirement 
of the emergency aid doctrine"; and (2) Ms. Willbanks had already received 
medical treatment and the officers' entry therefore "could not be based on a 
need to protect life or avoid serious injury." Aplt. Brf. at 10-11. 
Defendants' argument fails because the three-part emergency aid test was 
specifically rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Brigliam City v. 
Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006). Under Brigliam City, "law enforcement officers may 
enter a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured 
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added). The Court also recognized that the injury or harm need not be life-
threatening to justify police entry, but that police may enter to "prevent[ ]" such 
injury. Id. at 406. Finally, the Court held that "[t]he officer's subjective 
motivation [for entering] is irrelevant" and that "[i]t therefore does not matter 
. . . whether the officers entered [the home] to . . . gather evidence . . . or to . . . 
prevent further [harm]." Id. at 405. 
Brigliam City is dispositive of Defendants' argument. Whether Officer 
Hurst entered the home for the purpose of gathering evidence or ensuring no 
other children were in the home is irrelevant. The question is " 'whether the 
circumstances, viewed objectively, justified] [the] action.'" Id. at404 (citing Scott 
v. United States, 436 U.S. 128,138 (1978) (emphasis and second bracketed word in 
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original), hi this case, all that Officer Hurst knew was that one child was at a 
neighbor's home and other children were in the front yard. See Tr. 15. The 
record does not suggest that he knew all the children were accounted for.7 
Under these circumstances, Officer Hurst was justified in making the entry and 
sweeping the house to ensure no one else was inside. 
As also found by the district court, KM. 67, Officer Hurst's entry into the 
home was also justified to secure the premises and thereby prevent the 
destruction of the evidence. See State v. Duran, 2005 UT App 409, ^ 21,131 P.3d 
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"secured the premises"), ajfd, 2007 UT 23,156 P.3d 795. As with the children, 
Officer Hurst could not be certain that the house was free of others who could 
dispose of the evidence. 
B. In any event, Defendants' consent was not the product of any 
prior illegality. 
Even assuming, arguendo, the officers' entry into the home was unlawful, 
the consent was not the product of that illegality. 
In determining whether a person's consent was obtained by police 
exploitation of a prior illegality, this Court examines three factors: "(1) the 
7
 Defendants criticize Officer Hurst for failing to question Ms. Willbanks 
as to whether others were inside the home. Aplt. Brf. at 12. The record reveals, 
however, that she was being hauled off in an ambulance following what 
appeared to be a diabetic seizure. Under these circumstances, it did not appear 
that she was in any condition to respond to his questions. 
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'purpose and flagrancy' of the illegal conduct; (2) 'the presence of intervening 
circumstances/ and (3) the 'temporal proximity7 between the illegal detention 
and consent." Hansen, 2002 UT 125, % 64 (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 
603-04 (1975)). An examination of these factors weighs against a finding that 
Defendants' consent was the product of any prior police illegality. 
The purpose and flagrancy of the alleged police illegality in this case 
weighs against a finding of exploitation. The purpose of the entry was not to 
obtain consent. The Utah Supreme Court in Hansen held that "[wjhere the 
derived from the illegal conduct 'clearly will have a deterrent effect/" Id. at <[ 
65. That was not the case here. The facts here are unlike those in Hansen, where 
the officer impermissibly lengthened a detention, without reasonable suspicion, 
for the express purpose of securing a consent to search. See id. at f^ 66. In this 
case, the officers had probable cause that contraband was in the home based on 
Officer's Hurst's personal observation of marijuana on the stretcher and the 
EMT's statement that she discovered marijuana in the home. The officers' 
purpose in entering the premises, therefore, was to do no more than secure the 
premises and perhaps verify the EMT's observations. See Tr. 7,15-16, 28 (KM. 
70: 1 9). 
-18-
Moreover, any illegal entry was not flagrant. As explained above, any 
infringement of Defendants' privacy interests was nominal because Defendants' 
expectation of privacy in the home had already been significantly frustrated by 
the EMT's entry. The record is also clear that the officers did not conduct any 
additional search, but that their observations were limited to those items that 
were in plain view. Moreover, the officers did not seize the contraband, but 
awaited Defendants' arrival so they could determine whether they would need 
to proceed on a warrant or pursuant to consent. 
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illegality. Specifically, Sergeant Smith advised both Defendants of their Miranda 
rights before seeking Defendants' consent to search the premises,. Tr. 9-10, 24-
25 (KM. 69: f 13). Defendants were thus aware of their right to remain silent 
and to consult an attorney before speaking with police further. See Hansen, 2002 
UT 125, % 68 (holding that "[intervening circumstances may include such 
events as an officer telling a person he or she has the right to refuse consent or to 
consult with an attorney"). What is more, Sergeant Smith permitted Defendants 
to consult with one another before deciding whether they would require him to 
seek a warrant or consent to the search. Tr. 17, 25 (KM. 69: \ 13). 
Finally, the temporal proximity between Defendants' consent and the 
illegality also weighs against a finding of exploitation. The entries by Officer 
-19-
Hurst and Sergeant Smith both occurred prior to Defendants' arrival on the 
scene. Although the record does not indicate when Defendants arrived, it does 
reveal that both officers exited the home before they arrived and that the officers 
had to await their arrival. See Tr. 24 (KM. 70: \ 12). 
These factors, considered together, support a conclusion that Defendants' 
consent was not the product of any prior police illegality. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted June ID, ZUU9. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
E^REY S. GRAY 
(ssistant Attorney Gene: 
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The Court notes that there is an absence of facts which might have bearing on the 
decision of the Court. A preliminary hearing was conducted in this case on June 13, 2007 and 
both parties have cited to the record. However, neither party has requested an evidentiary 
hearing and neither has requested oral argument in this case. With that background, the Court 
determines the following facts: 
1. On April 15, 2007, Officer Jay Hurst responded to a medical detail at the Defendants' 
home. 
2. When Officer Hurst arrived at the home, Defendant Kendra Mabey's mother, Tammy 
Willbanks, was there. She had experienced a seizure. EMTs were attending to her and 
lifting her into an ambulance. 
3. As the EMTs were lifting Ms. Willbanks into the ambulance, Officer Hurst observed 
marijuana on the stretcher. 
4. Before the seizure, Ms. Willbanks had been tending the Defendants' children. 
5. An EMT told Officer Hurst that there was marijuana in the home. 
6. Officer Hurst asked the reporting EMT to show him the marijuana. The EMT took 
Officer Hurst to the master bedroom. 
7. Officer Hurst saw burnt marijuana joints and a marijuana pipe in the master bedroom. 
8. In addition, he saw marijuana plants on the counter in the master bathroom. 
9. Officer Hurst then "froze" the environment. He went through the home making sure 
there were no occupants inside. 
10. Officer Hurst called Sergeant Lance Smith. 
11. When Sergeant Smith arrived, Officer Hurst took him inside the home and showed him 
what was in plain view. This second plain view search lasted approximately five 
minutes. 
12. After the plain view search, Officer Hurst and Sergeant Smith went back outside and 
waited for the Defendants to arrive, 
13. When the Defendants arrived, the officers explained that they were called to the home 
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because Ms. Willbanks had had a seizure. They also explained that upon their arrival at 
the home, an EMT told them there was marijuana in the home. Finally, they explained 
that they had gone inside the home and seen marijuana and paraphernalia in plain view. 
The officers Mirandized the Defendants. Both Defendants then signed a consent form 
allowing the search of their home. 
14. During the subsequent search, Officer Hurst discovered a photograph of Mr. Mabey 
smoking a marijuana joint and a photograph of Ms. Mabey smoking a marijuana joint. 
II. 
Legal Analysis 
In this case, officers searched the Defendants' home, without a warrant, three times. 
Officer Hurst performed a plain view search in connection with his sweep of the home after 
observing marijuana on the ambulance stretcher and being informed by the EMT that there was 
marijuana in the home. When Sergeant Smith arrived at the scene, he and Officer Hurst 
performed a second plain view search. Finally, after the Defendants arrived at the scene and 
signed a consent form allowing the search of their home, Officer Hurst and Sergeant Smith 
performed a more thorough search. 
Searches performed "'outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or 
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment - subject only to a few 
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.'" State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 687 
(Utah 1990) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). The exceptions relevant 
in this case are the exigent circumstances exception and the consent exception. 
The exigent circumstances exception applies "where probable cause and exigent 
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circumstances are proven." State v. Comer, 51 P.3d 55, 64 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) (quoting State v. 
Yoder, 935 P.2d 534, 540 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)). Probable cause exists where the facts and 
circumstances known to the officers are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to 
believe that an offense has been or is being committed. Id. at 63 (quoting State v. Dorsey, 731 
P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah 1986)). Exigent circumstances exist where the delay in obtaining a 
warrant "would risk 'physical harm to the officers or other persons, the destruction of relevant 
evidence, or the escape of the suspect.'" State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 26 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 
(citation omitted). 
To determine whether the consent exception applies, courts apply a two-part test: '"(1) 
the consent must be voluntary in fact; and (2) the consent must not be obtained by police 
exploitation of the prior illegality.'" State v. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913, 918 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992)(citation omitted). The second part of the test only applies "when 'antecedent police 
illegality exists.'" Id. (citation omitted). Whether consent is voluntary '"is a fact sensitive issue 
to be determined by examining the totality of the circumstances,' including 'the specific 
characteristics of the accused and the details of the police conduct.'" Id. (citation omitted). 
Factors that indicate a lack of coercion in obtaining consent include "the officer's lack 'of a claim 
of authority to search,' 'the absence of an exhibition of force' by the officer, 'the officer's mere 
request to search,'" the defendant's "'cooperation'" and "the officer's lack of 'deception.'" Id. 
(citation omitted). 
A. 
Search No, 1 
The first plain view search performed by Officer Hurst was supported by probable cause 
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and exigent circumstances. Officer Hurst saw marijuana on the ambulance stretcher. In addition, 
the EMT told him that there was marijuana in the home. These facts and circumstances were 
sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense had been 
committed. Therefore, the search was supported by probable cause. Officer Hurst also knew 
Ms, Willbanks had been tending the Defendants' children. Nothing in the record suggests that 
Officer Hurst knew how many children the Defendants' had or whether they had all been 
removed from the home. The delay in obtaining a warrant would have risked potential physical 
harm to the children from the exposure to drugs if there were indeed children in the home. 
Moreover, if the officers had locked down the home with children still inside, the children could 
have suffered emotional trauma. In addition, the search of the home was authorized to remove 
anyone who might damage, destroy, or secrete the evidence. The Court notes that the subject 
evidence could have been easily destroyed, damaged, or secreted by anyone in the home. 
Therefore, the search was supported by exigent circumstances. Because the first plain view 
search performed by Officer Hurst was supported by probable cause and exigent circumstances, it 
was constitutionally permissible despite the absence of a warrant. 
B. 
Search No. 2 
Although the second plain view search performed by Officer Hurst and Sergeant Smith 
was supported by probable cause, it was not supported by exigent circumstances. During the first 
plain view search, Officer Hurst saw burnt marijuana joints and a marijuana pipe in the master 
bedroom. In addition, he saw marijuana plants on the counter in the master bathroom. These 
facts and circumstances were sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that 
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an offense had been committed. Therefore, the search was supported by probable cause. 
However, because, prior to the second plain view search, Officer Hurst had already swept the 
home and assured that there was no one inside, the delay in obtaining a search warrant would not 
have risked physical harm to anyone. Nor would it have risked the destruction of relevant 
evidence or the escape of the suspects, as the scene had already been secured. Therefore, the 
second plain view search was not supported by exigent circumstances. Accordingly, the search 
was unconstitutional. 
C. 
Search No. 3 
The third search was supported by consent. When the Defendants arrived at the scene the 
officers explained the situation and Mirandized them. The Defendants then signed a consent 
form allowing the search of their home. Nothing in the record indicates that the consent was 
involuntary on the part of either Defendant or that the officers deceived the Defendants. The 
officers explained that they were called to the home because Ms. Willbanks had had a seizure. 
They further explained that upon their arrival at the home, an EMT told them there was 
marijuana in the home. Finally, they explained that they had gone inside the home and seen 
marijuana and paraphernalia in plain view. After being advised of these facts and circumstances, 
both Defendants signed a consent form allowing the search of their home. Although the consent 
was obtained after the officers performed an illegal search of the home (the second search), it 
was supported by an explanation of facts known to Officer Hurst as a result of his initial, legal 
search of the home. In other words, the Defendants' consent was not obtained by police 




Defendants' Joint Motion to Suppress is granted in part and denied in part. The initial 
plain view search of the Defendants' home was supported by probable cause and exigent 
circumstances. The third search was supported by consent. Therefore, to the extent Defendants' 
Motion relates to evidence discovered as a direct result of those searches, their Motion is denied. 
However, the second plain view search was not supported by exigent circumstances or any other 
exception to the warrant requirement. Accordingly, the second plain view search was 
unconstitutional. Therefore, to the extent the Defendants' Motion relates to evidence discovered 
as a direct result of that search, their Motion is granted. Because these Motions were submitted 
on the memoranda without an evidentiary hearing and without oral argument, it is unclear what 
evidence, if any, was discovered during the second search. 
By the Court, 
Judge Lynn W. Davis 
/ / Z?ec. &C° ^ 
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